Nationalization Means Nationalization
At the premiere of Dirty Business, the forthcoming Channel 4 television drama due to be released next week, based on the campaigning work of Windrush Against Sewage Pollution, something important happened.
During a room-wide applause for nationalisation, I said one sentence:
“Nationalisation means nationalisation, not Special Administration.”
That was all.
Not a speech. Not a disruption. A structural clarification made in the middle of applause.
In response, Cat Hobbs of We Own It stood and told the room:
“This gentleman is deceiving you all. He is linked to private equity.”
That is a serious allegation.
It is also untrue.
I am not funded by private equity. I am not acting on behalf of private equity. I am not directed by private equity.
I work part time in financial services recruitment. My analysis of water company capital structures is independent and unpaid. I publish at my own expense because financial architecture matters, especially when public infrastructure is financed through it.
That is analysis, not affiliation.
Policy disagreement is normal. Public mischaracterisation in front of 300 people is not.
The Sequence Matters
Days earlier, I had publicly distanced myself from We Own It.
My position was straightforward. If we mean nationalisation, we should say nationalisation. Not blur it with interim statutory mechanisms or alternative ownership structures.
In response, I was told that Special Administration is a step toward nationalisation.
So I asked structural questions.
How does creditor hierarchy change? What is the acquisition mechanism? How are senior secured claims treated? What valuation framework applies? Where is the legal pathway described?
Those questions were not answered.
Instead, at a public event, the issue became my supposed affiliation.
That shift matters.
This debate is not about personalities. It is about mechanism.
What Special Administration Is
Under the Water Industry Act 1991, Special Administration is a statutory rescue regime.[1]
Its purpose is continuity of essential services. It prevents disorderly insolvency of a regulated water company. It preserves the entity as a going concern while liabilities are reorganised under court supervision.[2]
For water utilities, ordinary liquidation of the operating company is not a realistic pathway. The statutory framework is explicitly designed to prevent service interruption.[1]
That is not collapse. It is stabilisation.
Stabilisation preserves enterprise value. Preserved enterprise value flows upward through the existing capital stack.
In practical terms, when a company is kept alive rather than broken up, remaining value is first applied to those at the top of the debt hierarchy, typically senior secured creditors, before junior creditors or equity see recovery.[3]
That is not ideology. It is insolvency law.
Special Administration creates time. It creates liquidity. It creates breathing space.
It does not, by itself, change ownership.
That distinction is structural.
The Creditor Reality
Senior creditor groups publicly associated with current water restructuring processes include institutions such as Elliott Management, Silver Point Capital, M&G and abrdn.[4]
Under UK restructuring law, plans can be imposed across dissenting creditor classes if statutory tests are met.[5] The court applies what is known as the “relevant alternative” test to determine whether dissenting creditors would be worse off than under the next most likely scenario.[6]
Voting thresholds matter. Valuation matters. Hierarchy matters.
Unless Parliament legislates to alter recovery outcomes, statutory restructuring operates within existing creditor priority.[5]
That is how capital structure allocates risk.
Why SAR Is Being Advocated
It is my view that the push toward Special Administration reflects a divergence of incentives between different investor constituencies.
The legacy institutional investor base in UK utilities includes large domestic asset managers, insurers and pension fund capital that historically operated within a stable regulatory framework. That group is not necessarily aligned with distressed senior creditors who now exercise practical influence over the capital structure through covenant enforcement and new money provision.[4]
If senior secured funds have consolidated control and are unlikely to concede economic ground voluntarily, then stakeholders outside that control group may view Special Administration as the only statutory route that alters negotiating leverage.
SAR changes the forum.[1]
It moves the process from a creditor-coordinated restructuring into a politically supervised framework.
If you cannot prevail within the existing hierarchy, you seek a framework that changes the arena.
Whether that results in public ownership, creditor protection, or some hybrid outcome depends entirely on Parliament’s choices.
What Nationalisation Would Actually Require
True nationalisation requires more than entering a statutory process.
It requires:
A political decision to acquire the assets. A defined valuation methodology. A clear position on compensation and creditor treatment. Acceptance of potential litigation under property and human rights law.[7]
Parliament is sovereign.[8] But sovereignty does not execute itself.
If creditor hierarchy is to be overridden, that must be done deliberately, transparently and through legislation.[8]
Special Administration may stabilise operations.[1] It may provide leverage. It may buy time.
But it does not automatically rewrite creditor priority.
If hierarchy is not rewritten, ownership does not fundamentally change.
Calling a rescue framework nationalisation does not transform it into one.
Language does not reorder the capital stack. Legislation does.
Parliamentary Framing
The APPG on Water Pollution is formally registered in Parliament.[9]
Its secretariat is provided by Seahorse Environmental Communications Ltd.[9]
The House of Commons register shows this role is funded by River Action and Surfers Against Sewage within a declared annual value band of approximately £37,000 to £39,000.[10]
Companies House records show that in December 2024, control of Seahorse transferred to a newly incorporated holding company, Seadragon Environmental Ltd, incorporated nineteen days earlier at the same registered address.[11]
Persons with Significant Control filings show Isabella Gornall retains 75 percent or more control through that structure.[12] Charles Lewington is listed as director.[13]
Publicly available professional biographies record that Charles Lewington previously served as Press Secretary to Conservative Prime Minister John Major and has since held senior roles in political communications and public affairs. Isabella Gornall’s published professional history includes advisory roles to Conservative MPs, work within Conservative Party election operations, and senior positions in environmental public affairs consultancies.
These profiles are matters of public record. They do not imply wrongdoing. They provide context about the professional and political experience shaping the secretariat environment around the APPG.
Institutional architecture shapes framing. Framing shapes expectations. Expectations shape political momentum.
That is a structural observation.
The Real Choice
If government tells senior creditors to inject substantial new equity on defined public terms and they refuse, the moment of decision arrives.
Preserve continuity within the existing capital hierarchy.
Or legislate to override that hierarchy and acquire the assets on terms defined by Parliament.[8]
That is the fork in the road.
Calling the first path nationalisation does not make it the second.
Anger and Outcome
Dirty Business will generate anger. It should. The failures in water governance are real.
But anger directed toward a statutory rescue mechanism that stabilises existing financial priority is not the same as systemic change.
If expectations are raised but the underlying hierarchy remains intact, public trust will erode further.
That erosion will not be caused by insolvency law.
It will be caused by describing one mechanism as something it is not.
This is not about personalities. It is not about motive. It is about structure.
Define the objective clearly.
If it is rescue, say rescue. If it is nationalisation, explain precisely how creditor priority will be altered and assets acquired.
Because in utility finance, structure determines outcome.
And in the end, outcomes, not applause, endure.
Endnotes
[1] Water Industry Act 1991, Part II, Chapter II – Special Administration Orders.
[2] Ofwat, “Our review of our processes and procedures for when a company may be in financial distress.”
https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/pap_tec20151015findistress.pdf
[3] Insolvency Service, Overview of UK Insolvency Framework and Creditor Hierarchy.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/insolvency-service-framework-document
[4] High Court Judgment, Re Thames Water Utilities Holdings Ltd [2025] EWHC 338 (Ch).
[5] Companies Act 2006, Part 26A – Restructuring Plans.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/part/26A
[6] Companies Act 2006, Section 901G – Relevant Alternative Test.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/section/901G
[7] Human Rights Act 1998; Protocol 1, Article 1.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/schedule/1
[8] Parliamentary Sovereignty – UK Parliament Overview.
https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/sovereignty/
[9] House of Commons – APPG on Water Pollution.
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/
[10] Register of All-Party Parliamentary Groups (20 November 2024). Page 429.
[11] Companies House – Seahorse Environmental Communications Ltd.
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/11190973
[12] Companies House – Seahorse PSC Register.
[13] Companies House – Seadragon Environmental Ltd Officers.
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/16121300/officers
Evidence Appendix
Primary Legislation Water Industry Act 1991
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1991/56
Companies Act 2006 – Part 26A
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/part/26A
Companies Act 2006 – Section 901G
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/section/901G
Human Rights Act 1998
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42
Judicial Material Re Thames Water Utilities Holdings Ltd [2025] EWHC 338 (Ch)
Regulatory & Institutional Ofwat – Financial Resilience and Special Administration
https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publication/financial-resilience-and-special-administration/
HM Treasury – Special Administration Regimes Guidance
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/special-administration-regimes-guidance
Parliamentary Records APPG on Water Pollution
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/
Companies House Records Seahorse Environmental Communications Ltd
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/11190973
Seadragon Environmental Ltd
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/16121300
